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Europe as a missed opportunity: looking backwards to 
modernity in France. 
  
Géraldine Bozec & Sophie Duchesne, Sciences Po 
IME book chapter proposal on Europe and modernity (the French case) – Dec. 2010 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged than in northern European countries, France included, the route 
to modernity was paved with nationalism, and that along the way, these nations were 
established as the secular, democratic, industrialised (and eventually post industrialised) 
welfare states we know today (Greenfeld 1992; Hobsbawm 1992). However, each of these 
countries took their own route to modernity, and experienced the tensions inherent in this 
process in their own way. Moreover, we know from previous work that European integration 
is “framed” by national culture; it is thus perceived differently in different European countries 
(Diez Medrano 2003). Has the specificity of France‟s route to modernity had an impact on the 
way the French have perceived Europe? More specifically, has it affected European 
integration and the possible generation of a corresponding identity?  
Addressing these questions means first providing a brief overview of the specificities of 
the French route to modernity, with an emphasis on the tensions that it was born out of. We 
will move on to an account of the limited and ambiguous ways in which intellectuals have 
explicitly referred to modernity in their discussions of Europe over the last century. In the 
third section, we will focus on the role of political debate, showing how a range of issues, 
positions and divisions have been reduced to a single choice between being “pro” or “anti” 
Europe. We will conclude by addressing the consequences of this limited debate concerning 
France‟s European future, its impact on French citizens‟ attitudes towards their new political 
community, and the “missed opportunity” that this lack of debate represents1.  
 
 
1) The French route to modernity: specific features 
 
The literature on modernity generally takes a broad theoretical approach to this notion, and 
even in France tends to focus on Western societies in general, rather than closely examining 
the specificities of the French case (Boisvert 1996; Bonny 2004; Freitag 2002; Javeau 2007; 
Lipovetski 2004; Lyotard 1979; Maffesoli 2000; for an exception focused on the French route 
to political modernity, see Barbier 2000). However, there are authors who explicitly refer to 
the concepts of modernity and modernisation when studying specific aspects of French 
history (especially economic development, state-building, religion and secularism).  
Most authors begin by agreeing on the centrality of the French Revolution in the 
emergence and development of modernity in France. Although certain continuities between 
the French Revolution and the monarchy that preceded it are commonly emphasised 
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(especially regarding the centralisation of the state before and after the revolution, see below), 
it is still broadly considered a key turning point because it implemented the central claims of 
the Enlightenment. Individual rights were declared universal and political sovereignty and 
legitimacy were transferred from the monarch to the nation, defined as a community of 
citizens. The revolution gave rise to the idealised figure of the citizen: an abstract individual 
who must detach him or herself from their particular interests and sub-national identities 
(religion, social class and so on) to enter the public sphere (Schnapper 1994, 2000; 
Rosanvallon 1992). The French Revolution is considered the origin of the universalist and 
individualist vision of the nation and citizenship, and the source of a specific tradition that 
continues to run deep in contemporary French political culture (Krulic 2007).  
However, the route to modernity in France was no more linear and univocal than in any 
other country (Eisenstadt 2000; Arnason 2003). According to Barbier (2000), the long and 
difficult implementation of political modernity in France was mainly due to the weight of the 
monarchy and the aristocracy in the nation‟s past; compared to the United States, for example, 
which embarked directly on political modernity when it became a fully autonomous state. The 
19
th
 century in France was marked by instability and recurrent restoration of regimes opposed 
to the democratic principles of the revolution (monarchies and Empires). Moreover, 
throughout the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries, various political movements remained vehemently 
critical of the modernity represented by the French Revolution. These voices of criticism 
included the counter-revolutionary ideology of de Maistre (late 18
th
 – early 19th centuries); the 
nationalist ideology of Barrès or Maurras (late 19
th
 – early 20th centuries); the ideology of the 
Vichy regime (1940- 1944); and the political thought of the National Front (since the 1980s). 
In spite of their significant differences, these movements have defended a vision of the French 
nation that is both organic and natural, based on the perpetuation of age-old traditions and the 
maintenance of ethnic homogeneity (Birnbaum 1991; Winock 2004). Some of them also 
emphasised the role of Catholicism in French national identity, and the image of France as the 
„eldest daughter‟ of the Catholic Church.  
Republican theorists were not homogeneous in their perspectives either, however, instead 
demonstrating a range of conceptions of the nation and citizenship (Déloye 1994; 
Rosanvallon 1992). Some republicans insisted on the principles of the Enlightenment, 
centring their vision on a contractual, universalistic, and individualistic conception of the 
nation; in which the individual‟s commitment to the national community, their willpower and 
rational thought were central. Other republicans demonstrated a more communitarian 
conception. Without defining the nation as a closed ethnic community (unlike right-wing 
nationalist movements), they awarded more importance to the idea that individuals are 
inexorably anchored in their national community, and that the nation is a salient category that 
has evolved out of a long shared history. 
Another related dimension of the French political struggle of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, 
much discussed in the literature, is the long-lasting conflict between Catholics and republicans 
(Baubérot 1990; Birnbaum 1993; Déloye 1994; Hervieu-Léger, 2003). This confrontational 
relationship is  more than a  power struggle between two centralised and highly influential 
institutions; it is also connected to the historical symbiosis of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries; 
between the Catholic religion and the pre-revolutionary order of the Ancien Regime – and thus 
also the monarchist cause. This confrontation eventually led to a specific institutional 
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arrangement, settled during the late 19
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries in the form of the French 
principle of „laïcité‟. This scarcely translatable concept was the result of the intentional 
obligatory secularisation of public institutions (Hervieu-Léger 2003); it corresponds to a 
particularly high degree of separation between religion and the state (Baubérot 2006). Over 
time, Catholics have rallied to the Republic and to the principle of laïcité, although French 
history has continued to be marked by successive compromises on both sides (Baubérot 1990; 
Mayeur 1997).   
Despite the advent of secularism and the decline of the social and institutional influence of 
the church over the course of the 20
th
 century, Catholicism nevertheless continues to play a 
significant role within French modernity. Both Hervieu-Léger (2003) and Birnbaum (2003) 
argue, in different ways, that there are affinities between Catholicism and French 
republicanism. Hervieu-Léger points out the analogies between the institutional arrangement 
of the Catholic religion and the organisation of the republican state in France. Like the 
Catholic Church, the French republican state system is hierarchical, centralised and 
territorialised; the authority figure of the republican teacher mirrors that of the priest; and the 
way republicanism conceives the „community of citizens‟, insisting on unity and harmony, 
resembles the image of the community of the faithful in Catholicism. According to Birnbaum, 
the „French exception‟ is essentially in the emphasis on cultural unification – be it based on 
Catholic principles or republican ones.  
Overall, the long struggles between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, the 
conflict between Catholics and republicans, and the plurality and tensions within 
republicanism itself, have all contributed to a vision of the French nation wrought with 
internal conflict. According to this vision, France is seen as both universalist (born out of the 
revolution and empowered by Enlightenment values) and unique (steeped in a past considered 
singularly immemorial and glorious). The tension between these two faces of French national 
identity, inherited by most citizens (Duchesne 1997), has clearly been reactivated in the last 
decade both by intellectuals and in political discourse (Laborde 2010; Hayward 2007). This 
was particularly obvious during the so-called “debate on national identity” called for by 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, and organised by the government in autumn 2009.  
This debate, and the way it was launched by the government, underlines another inherited 
feature of the French route to modernity: the centrality of the state, and the strength and 
legitimacy of its unifying mission. This is seen as the result of the highly developed feudalism 
that existed in France, which enabled the monarchy to concentrate its power and unify the 
national territory by force. By contrast, feudalism in England was less fragmented, and 
political centralisation was achieved earlier through the mechanisms enabling representation 
of territorial and social peripheries (Badie and Birnbaum 1979; Birnbaum 1993). This process 
of centralisation by the state was accentuated in France from the French Revolution onwards. 
A large state bureaucracy was set up in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, and its numerous staff were 
trained in prestigious state educational institutions. From the late 19
th
 century onwards, the 
public school system was expanded and eventually made compulsory, contributing both to the 
homogenisation of national values and the standardisation of the French language (Peres 
1994; Weber 1983). After 1945, the centralisation of the state continued with the development 
of  welfare state policies and state organised economy.   
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The perceived supremacy of the state and its unifying mission had two major consequences 
that shaped the French route to modernity. Firstly, counter-state forces (mainly the Catholic 
Church and trade-unionism) developed in a particularly confrontational way in France 
(Birnbaum 1993); anarcho-syndicalism (inspired notably by Proudhon‟s thought), which is 
explicitly an anti-state unionism, was particularly strong for example. Secondly, the dominant 
and homogenising role of the state resulted in a weak organised civil society. In comparison 
with most other Western democracies, local organisations, associations and all kinds of 
intermediate structures, supposed to bring life to the public sphere, have remained weak in 
France (Archambault & Boumendil 1999; Barthélémy, 2000; Simonet, 1998). The historical 
importance of unity in France goes some way to explaining that pluralism in society remains 
difficult to acknowledge, and that little room is made for the expression of diversity. In 
particular, this accent on unity accounts for the historic struggle against regional languages in 
French public primary schools in the first part of the 20
th
 century (Weber 1983; Chanet 1996), 
but also for the more recent debates surrounding France‟s signature of the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages. It also accounts for the difficult accommodation of the 
cultural diversity related to immigration in recent decades and to the presence of a large 
Muslim community in France. Pluralism and diversity conflict with both aspects of the French 
imagined community (Duchesne 2005): both with its universalistic aspirations on one hand 
(Schnapper 1994), and its nostalgic belief in a unique historical identity (Thiesse 2010). 
Up until the 1960s-1970s, the idea of France as a model of modernity was common in the 
social sciences literature. France was often presented as a precocious nation-state (and 
democracy) with a universalistic message that was a model for other nations. France‟s 
universalism was sometimes emphasised in a way that overlooked the fact that their allegedly 
“universal” values were in fact simply French. Nevertheless, over the last thirty years, a 
critical view of French history and its ethnocentric trends has been developing in the 
literature. This critical approach deconstructs the „national myth‟ built by historians and state 
elites (Citron 2008) and conveyed to French citizens through education (Bozec 2010). It 
highlights forms of oppression that are an integral part of French history (Citron 2008; Noiriel 
2006, 2007). This critical stance goes hand in hand with the push for a plural narrative of 
history; one which takes into account the importance of cultural diversity, and pays attention 
to processes of domination, notably those related to colonisation (Blanchard et al 2005).  
The key features of the specific French route to modernity can thus be summarised as 
follows: the decisive impact of the revolution; the permanent tension between universalism 
and a sense of immemorial identity within the conception of the nation; the persistent impact 
of the antagonism between Catholicism and republicanism; the central role of the state, its 
supremacy over civil society and its unifying mission; and, as a consequence of this mission, 
France‟s difficult relationship with pluralism. How has this combination of factors influenced  
the way European unification has been perceived in France over the last century? More 
specifically, has it been experienced as a new step towards modernity or not? To address these 
questions we will look at French discourses on Europe since WWI – from intellectuals 
(Section 2) and political actors (Section 3), exploring the ways they have referred to 
modernity (or not).  
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2) Europe and modernity in French intellectual discourses since WWI: 
from engagement to lack of interest or criticism 
 
Since the First World War, some French intellectuals have seen European unification as a 
possible way of achieving a new political modernity; associating it with the ideas of peace, 
democracy, and the containment of the negative effects of nationalism. However, some also 
regard it as a means of fighting against Europe‟s decline. However, these positive 
perspectives on Europe were developed at specific points in time, mainly during and 
immediately after WWII. When European integration actually developed, from the 1950s 
onward, most French intellectuals turned away from Europe as a valuable route to a new 
modernity.  
 
The Europeanist movement in France in the interwar years: European unification as a 
means of fighting against Europe’s decline and the dangers of nationalism  
 
Up until the Second World War, French authors made a significant contribution to 
reflections on European unification. French proposals for a united Europe can be traced back 
to the Middle Ages (du Réau 2001). From the 18
th
 century onwards, French thought about 
European unity was more and more connected to democratic principles and to the idea of 
peace – with the exception of Napoleon‟s attempt to unify Europe by force in the early 19th 
century. During the second half of the 19
th
 century, the idea of European unity gained more 
ground and was advocated by various figures and movements, from promoters of free-trade to 
pacifists and socialists. However, the rise of nationalism between 1870 and 1914 slowed 
down the movement in favour of European unity. Moreover, internationalism, not limited in 
scope to the European continent, gained more and more influence in pacifist and socialist 
circles and tended to eclipse Europeanism (Dulphy & Manigand 2006).  
The First World War represented an important turning point. The shock of the war led to 
the emergence and development of a significant Europeanist movement, both in France and 
elsewhere in Europe. Although it developed mainly in the international circles of the League 
of Nations in Geneva (Dulphy & Manigand 2006), the unification of Europe was then 
regarded as an important goal and was supported by specific organisations and journals, as 
well as by a European network of elites (Chabot 2005). French actors from both intellectual 
and economic circles took a significant role in this, and were supported by French politicians 
from the Radical party (the French centrist political movement, very influential during the 
Third Republic), the Christian-Democrats and the non-Marxist left.  
An essential component of Europeanism during the interwar years was obviously a deep 
desire for peace. As noted by Bonneville (1961), pacifism led intellectuals to advocate the 
union of Europe and conversely, the credo in European unity required pacifism: they were 
inextricably linked. The feeling that a new war would lead to the self-destruction of Europe 
was a significant aspect of Europeanism during this period. 
European activists also worried about what they considered to be the decline of European 
civilisation. French intellectuals, as well as those from other parts of Europe, expressed a 
profoundly pessimistic vision. They emphasised the idea of a spiritual and moral crisis 
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generated by the war, as well as the general loss of Christian values and the new rise of 
materialism. Materialism, often associated with American culture, was considered to be 
developing at the expense of intellect, which was seen as a specific feature of European 
civilisation. Chabot shows that some Europeanist intellectuals in France, such as the 
columnist Gaston Riou or the philosopher Julien Benda, saw European unification as a means 
of regenerating Europe, both spiritually and morally. For these thinkers, the idea of Europe 
was charged with religious meaning.  
 The unification of Europe was thus also seen as a means of challenging political 
ideology, particularly nationalism and to a lesser extent Soviet communism (Chabot, 2005). 
Although some French intellectuals tended to see the future united Europe as a nation, this 
European „nation‟ was perceived as potentially countering the negative effects of nationalism. 
According to Julien Benda, who published his Discours à la nation européenne (speech to the 
European nation) in 1933, the future European nation would be less „impious‟ than current 
nations since it would create a less solid, exclusive, and affective link between individuals and 
their territory. Benda assimilated Europe to the victory of rationality, universalism, and 
abstraction. His perspective is ambiguous, however, because the desired Europe was 
implicitly to take the form of the French „hexagon‟ (Lacroix 2008; Müller 2006): the common 
language for Europe would necessarily have been French, since he believed it to be the most 
rational language, and Europe‟s universalism was identified with France – and opposed to 
Germany‟s particularism.  
Although relayed by one prominent French political figure, Aristide Briand, from the mid-
1920s to the early 1930s, the Europeanist movement failed because of the divergences both 
between and within nations, and above all, because of the climate of economic crisis and the 
international tensions of the 1930s. The „intellectualism‟ of the Europeanist movement was 
another element that played a role in the failure of the European idea in the interwar years 
(Chabot 2005). Europeanism mainly came from intellectuals who believed in the power of 
thought, but their publications scarcely made an impact on public opinion.  
Finally, let us not forget that if Europeanism was intended to favour peace, for French 
intellectuals it also represented a challenge to the economic and political rise of the United 
States and the waning of European power. The relationship with the United States was 
ambiguous, since it was simultaneously based on competition, on embodied materialistic 
values, on the rejection of a power that was making Europe its economic “vassal”,  and on the 
imitation of what was perceived to be an economic model (Chabot 2005; Bussière, Dumoulin 
1998).  
 
Post-1950s European integration, accompanied by a decline in pro-active thought about 
Europe. 
 
Europeanism reappeared during the Second World War amongst members of the French 
Resistance and its socialist and Christian-democrat components in particular. This diffuse pro-
European feeling became true awareness after the discovery of the concentration camps. This 
triggered a general desire for peace and the rapprochement of peoples, ideas which were 
embodied in the very notion of European unification (Girault 1994). The immediate post-war 
period has much in common with the interwar years since there was a profusion of various 
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Europeanist movements. Some post-1945 Europeanist figures had already been active in the 
Europeanist movement of the interwar years (du Réau 2001), but their voices had greater 
impact and led to greater concrete achievements after the war. However, given that the 
European initiative was essentially in the hands of state actors, the involvement of French 
intellectuals declined (du Réau 2001; Frank 2004b; de Puymège 1997).  
Indeed, the period after 1945 is characterised by what Bachoud calls the „European 
paradox of intellectuals‟. After the 1950s, in the very period of the construction of European 
integration, only a few intellectuals put forward strong Europeanist convictions– in France as 
elsewhere (Bachoud, Cuesta, Trebitsch 2009). French prominent intellectual figures took part 
in the Congress of La Haye in 1948, but their enthusiasm for European unification declined 
shortly after. The Cold War marked a turning point, with the central issue becoming the need 
to take a stance on communism and the Soviet Union.  
The strong influence of Marxism in intellectual circles in France is one of the key factors 
explaining why many French intellectuals considered European integration in a negative light 
(Girault 1994). In the 1960s, many of them saw Europe as the incarnation of the West at a 
time when they were engaged in fighting American and Western interests in support of the 
Third-World. Beyond Marxist intellectuals, many other French thinkers regarded the 
European Community as being too liberal economically and too technocratic – and still do 
today.  
A more positive conception of Europe did emerge in the 1970s. The reception of 
Soljenitsyne‟s book The Gulag Archipelago in France provoked a limited revival of 
Europeanist thought amongst French intellectuals. At the time, Europe was more associated 
with the fight for freedom and democracy (Bachoud, Cuesta, Trebitsch 2009); the publication 
of the Manifesto of the „Committee of Intellectuals for a Europe of freedoms‟ in 1978 is 
symbolic of this trend. This manifesto attracted support from diverse quarters, from Christian-
democrats, the non-Marxist left and liberals. Aside from this specific period, however, the 
European project did not attract that much attention from French intellectuals.  
French writing on Europe reappeared in the 1990s and 2000s, but it was mainly reactive 
and provoked by EU institutional developments and policies, especially the controversies 
surrounding the Maastricht Treaty and then the Constitutional Treaty. According to Lacroix 
and Magnette (2008), over the last two decades, most French intellectuals have tended to 
focus on the future of democracy and nations in general. They do not thoroughly address the 
specific experience of European integration and do not see Europe as an object of intrinsic 
value for thinking about the future. When the EU is the specific object of analysis, it tends to 
be seen in a negative light and not as a potential political community.  
Lacroix (2008) distinguishes three main paradigms in French political thought about 
Europe over the last twenty years. The first one – „disincarnated Europe‟ – is predominant, 
taking the form of a denunciation of European construction on the grounds of the absence of a 
defined political body with a common past, shared boundaries and collective goals (which can 
provide citizens with a sense of identity and security).  It brings together authors such as 
Pierre Manent, Marcel Gauchet or Paul Thibaud and is regularly expressed in major 
intellectual journals such as Le Débat or Commentaire. Some of these authors, however, try to 
combine the nation and Europe by continuing to emphasise the nation as the key political 
space, but also recognising a form of transnational power in the EU.  
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The second paradigm – „dreamt Europe‟ – is much less influential. This is a French version 
of the cosmopolitan perspective (inspired by Habermas) on Europe. According to Jean-Marc 
Ferry, one of the most important representatives of this trend, it is necessary to dissociate 
democracy and the nation-state because mastery of the future (especially of economic 
globalisation) is only possible at the European level. European identity must not be conceived 
of in substantial terms, since the very meaning of Europe is to be in a constant reflexive 
relationship with its past and traditions. The political integration of Europe is not only 
desirable, but is rendered possible by the development of horizontal links between Europeans 
and a juridical integration of national states.  
The third paradigm – „missed Europe‟ – mainly represented by Etienne Balibar, also sees 
the European project in a positive light: as a means of fostering individual rights, democracy, 
and the rejection of nationalism. However, there is a profound disenchantment with the 
current process of European integration, because it is seen as contradicting cosmopolitan 
claims, which are considered the core of the European project. Balibar stresses that EU 
policies regarding rights and citizenship lead to systematic practices of exclusion, because 
citizenship is not disconnected from nationality. This leads to the denial of certain basic rights  
based on a new kind of otherness, in the figure of non-UE citizens and illegal immigrants, 
which is tantamount to a form of „European apartheid‟. 
It is important to emphasise that the second paradigm is the only one to take into account 
the originality of the European experience. The other two interpret the EU within the 
framework of a discussion on the future of democracy, rights and politics in a post-national 
world that goes beyond Europe. The first paradigm criticises the extension of individual rights 
and the destruction of the potential for collective political action and collective political 
identities, whereas the third paradigm, on the contrary, sees the extension of individual rights 
as positive but calls for a political community that is as inclusive as possible. Overall, 
compared to Germany, Scandinavian countries and even the UK, forms of European 
federalism or post-nationalism that put European integration at the core of a new stage of 
modernity, are singularly absent in contemporary French political thought (Lacroix & 
Magnette 2008).  
 
3) Political debate on European integration since WWI: constraining the 
choice between pro- and anti-Europeanism 
 
Since WWI, most political and state actors in France have only considered Europe as an 
element of modernity in a very limited way. This is because modernity refers more to the 
nation‟s tradition and power than to the European project. Europe is also prevented from 
being a meaningful reference in France by the major parties‟ unanimous discourse about it.  
 
The privileged link between modernity and the French nation 
 
In the interwar years, there were French political figures who played an active role in 
fostering European unification. Aristide Briand, for example, is a name that remains deeply 
associated with pacifism and Europeanism. Briand was French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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several times, and also Prime Minister between 1925 and 1932; he was responsible for the 
French proposal made in 1929-1930 to institutionalise a European union. After WWII, 
prominent figures in the French state, such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, also firmly 
advocated European unification, and committed themselves to the first steps of actual 
European integration in the 1950s. In the following decades, the involvement of French state 
actors persisted, with the exception of the 1960s when President Charles de Gaulle firmly 
defended French national independence, provoking political crises on the European political 
scene. From the 1950s through to the 1980s, European integration was linked to the ideas of 
French economic modernisation, peace and democratic values. However, the close association 
between modernity and the power and tradition of the French nation has prevailed over the 
European project throughout the whole of the 20
th
 century.    
The role played by Europe in the modernisation of the French economy was emphasised in 
the first decades of European integration, from the 1950s to the 1980s, without much debate. 
The European Economic Community was seen as encouraging the opening of an economy 
(that had traditionally been quite protectionist) and the modernisation of key economic 
sectors, particularly agriculture (Muller 1984). Nevertheless, even during this period, Europe 
was considered to be just one factor in French economic modernisation; a central role was 
also granted to the state‟s economic planning. From the 1990s onwards, Europe was less and 
less represented in light of economic modernity. Faced with the rise of anti-liberalist 
movements, French state actors instead insisted on the importance of French public services, 
the welfare state and the necessity for the EU to take these institutions into account.  
As for political modernity, state actors have repeatedly connected Europe with the ideas of 
peace, human rights and democracy. This was particularly true in the founding period of 
European integration (the 1950s), then again when the centre-right was in power (President V. 
Giscard d‟Estaing, between 1974 and 1981), and again when the socialist left governed 
France in the 1980s. However, these political values are most often represented by French 
state actors as a national tradition, dating back to the French Revolution and republicanism, 
rather than as associated with the European project itself (Risse 2010).  
Since WWII, state actors have also perceived Europe as a means of preserving France‟s 
international power. After the war, this power was seen as declining because of the French 
defeat in 1940, the new international influence of the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
the beginning of decolonisation (Bossuat 1996; du Réau 2001; du Réau and Frank 2002). 
Through European unification, France aimed for „reincarnation‟ (Brzezinski 1997: 91) or 
„extension‟ (Delanty 2005). French actors saw Europe as a way of pursuing national interests 
(by stimulating economic modernisation and growth) and extending national policies to the 
European level (Dulphy and Manigand 2006). Europe was then an instrument of national 
power and a place for the projection of French national identity through the creation a 
„French‟ Europe, i.e. a Europe that would resemble France. This French understanding of the 
EU has been increasingly thrown into question by the loss of French influence in the domains 
of politics, culture and economics, as well as by the EU‟s enlargements eastwards. It has also 
been challenged by the culture of compromise that is a key feature of EU institutions and 
which has been considerably accentuated with the successive enlargements. However, this 
conception of Europe as a space for national influence still persists, hindering the 
Europeanization of French political identity and of public debate (Risse 2010). 
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French governing parties dodged the debate about Europe  
 
Since the beginning of the integration process, there has been division and contestation 
regarding Europe, both amongst French political elites and within political parties.  
The Socialist Party may be seen as one of the political forces that most frequently 
supported European unification throughout the 20
th
 century. However, since 1945, this party 
has also been divided on European unification, at various points in time and for different 
reasons (Delwit 1995; Frank 2004b; Bergounioux & Grunberg 2005). These reasons were 
sometimes related to political strategy; its alliance with the Communist Party, which was very 
critical towards Europe unification, prevented the PS from emphasising its European 
engagement during the 1970s. There were also disagreements concerning the relative 
importance of the nation, Europeanism and internationalism, and strong criticism of the 
liberal economic orientation of the EU, amongst the more left-wing factions within the 
Socialist Party. Generally speaking, until the 1980s, the French Socialist party was quite 
reticent about the reformism advocated by most European Left parties (Bergounioux & 
Grunberg 2005). Nevertheless, over recent decades, and more specifically since they were 
elected in the early 80s, leaders of the French Socialist Party have moved closer to the 
principles of social democracy and have significantly attenuated their criticism of the free 
market. Such reorientation has enabled the French Socialist Party to affirm its European 
engagement more strongly (Rorsher 1999). As a result, it has become less isolated in Europe, 
and along with parties on the European Left it has called for fairly incremental improvements 
to the EU‟s social dimension (Delwit 1995; Olivier 2005). In spite of this, some left-wing 
trends within the Socialist Party, as well as some prominent Socialist figures, continue to 
criticise the EU, denouncing both the undemocratic aspects of the EU‟s political system, and 
the EU‟s overly restrictive social and public services policies. During the referendum 
campaign in 2005, the split within the Socialist party on the issue of Europe was briefly 
acknowledged.  
The French right was also marked by significant and longstanding divisions on Europe 
(Sauger 2005). The liberal trends on the right were favourable to European unification, at 
least in the form of a vast free market. The centre-right movement represented by the 
Christian-Democrats made the European cause a central element of its political identity, 
which remained stable throughout the 20
th
 century. Moreover, the Gaullist tradition saw 
Europe as a necessary means of preserving national influence and power, while demonstrating 
a profound attachment to national independence and sovereignty. In 1962, several Christian-
Democrat MPs resigned from government after de Gaulle‟s denunciation of the directions of 
European integration. In 1978, in a famous speech called the „Appeal of Cochin‟, Gaullist 
Jacques Chirac stigmatised the centrist liberal President, Valéry Giscard d‟Estaing, for his 
commitment to Europe. In this speech, he advocated France‟s independence from a Europe 
dominated by „merchants‟. The UMP (created in 2002 after a fusion between the Gaullist 
RPR and the centrist UDF), the dominant right-wing party currently in government, is less 
divided on this issue today. This is largely because of the conversion of Chirac to the 
European cause in the early 1990s (Startin 2005; Jardin 2001).   
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On both the left and the right, political contestation of Europe provoked divisions within 
the major parties. French so called „sovereigntist parties‟ emerged in the 1990s in the wake of 
the Maastricht Treaty. On the left of the political spectrum, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, former 
member of the Socialist Party, founded the „Mouvement des citoyens‟ in 1993. On the right, 
Philippe de Villiers created the „Mouvement pour la France‟ (MPF) in 1994, and Charles 
Pasqua founded the „Rassemblement pour la France‟ (RPF) in 1999. While the ideologies of 
these parties differed, they all opposed the EU in the name of the defence of national 
sovereignty. They also identify democracy and social solidarity with the national framework 
only. The MPF and the RPF had some electoral success in the 1990s, but this was only 
temporary and mostly limited to European elections. 
Clearly positioned as an anti-system party, the National Front has expressed a strong 
„Europhobia‟ since the 1990s, repeatedly calling for France to leave the EU. This negative 
attitude towards Europe has not always characterised the FN‟s discourse, however. In the 
1980s, Europe was seen as positive and identified with the Christian West, in opposition to 
migration threats coming from extra-European countries (Rozenberg 2007). The National 
Front has vigorously denounced immigration related to the creation of the Schengen area and 
to the enlargement of the EU, as well as the risk of the so-called „Islamisation‟ of Europe with 
the potential entry of Turkey into the European Union. Moreover, in a context in which right-
wing parties in government have widely supported European integration since the 1990s, the 
anti-European discourse of the National Front has also been a means of differentiating 
themselves from the rest of the right.  
Political contestation of Europe also stems from what Rozenberg (2007) calls „ruralist 
localism‟. According to this perspective, the EU is criticised on behalf of the preservation of 
local particularities and traditions. The dominant representative of this kind of political 
contestation is the political party „Chasse Pêche Nature & Traditions‟ (CNPT), i.e. a political 
movement created in 1989 to protest against the EU‟s directives regarding hunting. In the 
„rural localist‟ discourse, Europe is presented as a remote power that undermines the daily 
practices of ordinary citizens. The „localist‟ discourse has spread amongst French political 
elites; all the more so as most French MPs cumulate local and national mandates and award 
much importance to their direct connection with their local voters (Rozenberg 2005).  
Finally, since the mid-1990s, there has also been a new form of political contestation 
against Europe. Much less institutionalised, this challenge comes from heterogeneous 
organisations and takes the form of anti-liberalism. Anti-liberal parties and organisations call 
for „another Europe‟. They denounce the EU‟s liberal economic policies and the technocratic 
character of the EU‟s political system. This anti-liberal trend is represented by extreme-left 
parties: the Communist Party, the Trotskyites from the „Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire‟ 
(the LCR, which became recently the „Nouveau Parti Anti-capitaliste‟, the NPA), as well as 
„Lutte Ouvrière‟ (LO). It also attracts some members of the Green Party (although the 
majority of Greens are on the contrary very much Europhile) and some members of the 
Socialist Party. Civil society organisations, such as some of the major trade unions, 
foundations (the Copernic Foundation) and political associations (ATTAC), are also 
components of this anti-liberal movement. Anti-liberalism has developed since the mid-1990s 
and culminated during the referendum campaign on the European Constitutional Treaty in 
2005.  
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Considering the amount and diversity of political contestation of European integration, it is 
surprising to see how little place has been granted to this issue in public debate in recent 
decades. According to Bartolini (2001), the European issue attracts little public attention from 
political parties in European countries since it does not match the traditional political alliances 
between parties and, moreover, is a source of internal division for some of them. Such an 
analysis appears valid for France, but there are other reasons, which might be more specific to 
the French case, that may be added.  
The Socialists Party and the major right-wing party, heir to the Gaullist tradition, have 
been governing the country for thirty years now. Both have been internally divided over the 
process of European integration, as we saw above. However, when in government, they have 
managed to maintain a European line since the early 1980s. They have framed the European 
project in terms of national interest, which prevents it from becoming a controversial issue. 
They have presented European integration in a unanimous way, emphasising the need to 
avoid isolating France in Europe and in the world; the advantage of a powerful Europe 
(including France) in confronting the U.S. and China; France‟s moral and legal engagements 
stemming from past agreements with other European countries, and so forth.  This has led to 
schisms within governing parties, with Eurosceptics creating new opposing parties, as we saw 
above. The French debate on Europe has thus become a debate between pro- and anti-
Europeans, structured along an opposition between major and minor parties. Governing 
parties have adopted consensual and low salience discourses on Europe, preventing public 
debate on the issue, whereas non-governing parties have tended to be openly Eurosceptic. The 
Green movement represents an exception in this respect – the new organisation, “Europe 
Ecologie”, was quite successful in the 2008 regional elections. In fact, this movement is both 
Europhile and committed to promoting public debate in order to discuss critical opinions 
regarding the workings and future of the EU. 
Clearly, the dynamics of political life in France have not produced a real public debate, 
based on alternative views of European integration
2
. The referendum campaign on the 
ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and its aftermath, is a good 
illustration of this. Citizens were asked to ratify a text, and attempts to discuss it tended to be 
interpreted as a rejection of Europe (Sauger, Brouard & Grossman, 2007). Moreover, the „no‟ 
expressed by French citizens was followed shortly after by the French Parliament‟s positive 
vote on a similar Treaty without contestation. Overall,  significant debate about the political 
future of Europe has hardly occurred in France.  
 
 
Conclusion: Europe as a missed opportunity for a new step to modernity 
 
Since WWI, French discourses and projects regarding Europe have been based both on the 
aim to re-establish national dominance in the European and global contexts, and the ambition 
to unify Europe in a way that resembles France – or that at least does not challenge its 
                                                 
2
 One exception to this attitude, aside from the split within the Socialist Party on the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty, was the mobilisation in 2004 of some prominent figures within the UMP (such Alain 
Juppé and the future President Nicolas Sarkozy) against the entry of Turkey into the EU – they opposed 
President Chirac‟s position and dramatised the question (Sauger 2005). 
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national traditions (in terms of public services, welfare policies, conceptions of democracy). 
The European project has, in fact, hardly been perceived as a way to achieve a new political 
modernity at all.  
Instead of focusing on French actors‟ discourses on modernity and Europe, we can also 
consider the notion of modernity itself, as it is defined in recent political and social theory. In 
this light, can we say that the French public debate on European integration has contributed to 
a new step in modernity? As Delanty (2007) suggests, it is the „self-transformative tendencies 
and self-conscious reflexivity‟ that is prominent in modernity, stemming from the existence of 
new dynamics and tensions. Another feature of modernity for theorists is the centrality of 
human agency in interpreting one‟s environment and in attempting to change it (Arnason 
2003; Giddens 1994, 1998). Self-reflexivity and human agency result in a specific orientation 
towards the future, which is regarded as the sphere for improvement, innovation, and change. 
Building a new political community at the European level represents a significant opportunity 
for encouraging a new step in modernity. Indeed, it is a voluntary project that requires actors 
to break away from national path-dependency and to question previous arrangements. As 
such, it encourages new dynamics and self-reflexivity (Delanty 2005), as well as future-
oriented attitudes (Abelès 1997, Belot 2000).  
However, the way European integration has been framed in France over recent decades, 
has not taken advantage of this opportunity and as a result, the link between Europeanization 
and the key features of the modernity processes is minimal. The persistent official support for 
European integration on the part of the French government was gained at the expense of 
public debate about the kind of future the EU could offer. Moreover, French intellectuals have 
contributed little to this debate. As a result, French citizens have gained a new political 
community and have become accustomed to it, in a way that does not particularly meet the 
expectations of modernity that Europe integration could have raised. Citizens have come to 
accept Europe as an inevitable but stable reality, and to consider themselves European as a 
consequence of being French (Bozec 2010, Duchesne & al 2010, Throssell 2010, Van 
Ingelgom 2010, Weil 2010). French identity is clearly the link between citizens and the 
European Union; they see the EU through the lens of the nation. European issues have no 
salience, they generate no strong feelings, no polarisation except in people who are politically 
sophisticated, and who are usually amongst the most educated. People who are interested in 
politics generally understand the influence of the EU on public policies, and thus care about 
the future of European integration; others do not, they show no interest and avoid argument or 
discussion of these themes. This lack of interest, which emerges clearly in qualitative 
research, contrasts with the popular Euroscepticism that scholars infer from survey data and 
have come to fear (see for instance Neil Fligstein‟s Euroclash 2008). But a careful reanalysis 
of Eurobarometer data shows that in France, neutral or indifferent attitudes towards European 
integration have increased more than negative attitudes, despite the strong politicisation of the 
campaign for the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (Van Ingelgom, 2010). This 
indifference has increased most particularly among working class people and those not 
interested in politics (Duchesne & Van Ingelgom 2009). 
Two elements help explain most ordinary non-politically active citizens‟ lack of interest 
for European integration. Firstly, they believe that this process is already over: there is no use 
being “for” or “against” the EU; it is there and cannot be reversed. In this sense, European 
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integration increases the diffuse popular feeling of being dominated by elites and politicians 
who make the decisions. Secondly, European issues have no salience because they are blurred 
by globalisation. Popular attitudes towards the EU are thus far from being organised around 
notions of agency and self-reflexivity. They do reflect strong tensions related to the role of 
their nation in a globalised world, but European integration is hardly an issue there (Duchesne 
& al. 2010).   
 
If Europe has the potential to be a new step towards modernity, the French route to 
European integration seems to have missed much of this opportunity. French public debate on 
Europe, both in the past and more recently, has rarely made explicit reference to a „European 
modernity‟, nor can this debate be connected to the notion of modernity as defined in recent 
theoretical approaches. French debate on Europe allows little room for self-reflexivity and 
discussion of different conceptions of the European future; the issues are simply reduced to a 
single low-salience cleavage – being “pro” or “anti” the EU. In spite of the results of 
European referendums and the decreasing turn-out in European elections, the EU has been 
widely accepted by French citizens, but it has been accepted passively.  
This missed opportunity is the result of many factors. The French route to modernity 
involved a national identity framed by the idea of France as one of the inventors of modernity 
itself, and by the vision a political community with the mission to disseminate universalistic 
values (inherited from the French Revolution) throughout the world. Hence, France‟s 
relationship to modernity has become backward-looking. French actors remain caught in this 
historical vision of modernity and cannot seem to imagine Europe offering a new one. 
Consequently, Europe appears to be a future imposed upon citizens without sufficient 
discussion or interpretation.  
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Summary : 
In northern European countries, France included, the route to modernity was paved with 
nationalism, and that along the way, these nations were established as the secular, democratic, 
industrialised (and eventually post industrialised) welfare states we know today. However, 
each of these countries took their own route to modernity, and experienced the tensions 
inherent in this process in their own way. Moreover, we know from previous work that 
European integration is “framed” by national culture; it is thus perceived differently in 
different European countrie. Has the specificity of France‟s route to modernity had an impact 
on the way the French have perceived Europe? More specifically, has it affected European 
integration and the possible generation of a corresponding identity?  
Addressing these questions means providing a brief overview of the specificities of the French 
route to modernity, with an emphasis on the tensions that it was born out of. We then move on 
to an account of the limited and ambiguous ways in which intellectuals have explicitly 
referred to modernity in their discussions of Europe over the last century. We thus focus on 
the role of political debate, showing how a range of issues, positions and divisions have been 
reduced to a single choice between being “pro” or “anti” Europe. We conclude by addressing 
the consequences of this limited debate concerning France‟s European future, its impact on 
French citizens‟ attitudes towards their new political community, and the “missed 
opportunity” that this lack of debate represents. 
